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GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
 
Commission European Commission 
Court of Justice Court of Justice of the European Union 
EEA European Economic Area 
EU European Union 
EU Merger Regulation Council Regulation No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 
on the control of concentrations between 
undertakings 
GDPR Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on 
the protection of natural persons with regard to the 
processing of personal data and on the free movement 
of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC 
HHI Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers 
under the Council Regulation on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings 
Member State A member state of European Union 
Merger Guidelines Horizontal and Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines  
Non-horizontal Merger Guidelines Guidelines on the assessment of non-horizontal 
mergers under the Council Regulation on the control 
of concentrations between undertakings 
OECD The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development 
SSNIP Small but Significant and Non-Transitory Increase in 
Price Test 






In 2002 Steven Spielberg’s blockbuster Minority Report was released, in which the 
protagonist Anderton is constantly traced with cameras and biometric sensors to gather 
information not only about his location and physique but also about his emotions and state 
of mind. That way, digital street signs and billboards could overwhelm him with personalized 
advertisements designed specifically to fulfil his current needs. In 2002 this marketing 
method was considered a science fiction that could possibly be realised in 2054. Today, 16 
years later, it is a part of our everyday lives. Companies today may not (yet) use any tracking 
devices, but they have developed something at least as effective, namely big data. 
 
The amount of data in today’s digital economy has been exploding. Some of the recent 
significant technological and commercial developments stimulated in the economy allowed 
companies mainly in online business, such as search engines or social networks, to base their 
business models on the collection and processing of information and data in ways, which 
were not possible before. Nowadays, the transfer of data has almost no boundaries. Within 
fractions of seconds, it is possible to send, copy, and process large data sets via the internet. 
Consumers themselves produce a tremendous amount of data each day – searching, 
communicating, browsing, shopping, sharing. As a result, information about individual 
consumers is nowadays more accessible than ever, but at the same time more commercially 
valuable. Companies utilize collected data to improve the quality of their products and 
services, develop brand new innovative product offerings, and monetize1 their services 
effectively, subsequently leading to the provision of better services for lower prices or even 
for free.2 
                                                 
1 “In online commerce, “monetization” refers to a provider’s ability to generate revenue from the content, 
services, or products offered to users, which are often provided for free. Many, if not most, online providers (as 
well as many traditional, offline firms) monetize their services through the showing of advertisements to users 
and the targeted advertising.” In: LERNER, A. V. The Role of “Big Data” in Online Platform Competition. 
2014, p. 12. Available at: <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2482780> 
2 LERNER, A. Op. cit., p. 10-18; SOKOL, D. D., COMERFORD, R. Antitrust and Regulating Big Data. In: 





Companies aware of the growing importance of data adopt business models that rely upon 
data and undertake data-driven strategies in order to gain competitive advantages.3 One of 
the ways how to outperform competitors is through strategic mergers and acquisitions, the 
number of which has been rising in the last years. According to OECD, the number of data-
related mergers rose from 55 in 2008 to 134 in 2012.4 European Director-General for 
Competition, Johannes Laitenberger emphasized in this year’s speech that significant 
companies in the digital economy such as Alphabet, Apple, Amazon, Facebook or Microsoft 
have alone realized over 400 acquisitions worth more than $130 billion over the last decade. 
As pointed out, it is therefore legitimate to wonder whether the competitive pressure of the 
new market players on the incumbents in the digital environment is strong enough.5 
 
The Commission has intensively scrutinised and worked on the interaction of competition 
policy, personal data and big data from the merger control angle, as the Commission itself 
highlighted in the last year’s Commission Staff Working Document accompanying the 
Report on Competition Policy 2016.6 Current European Commissioner for Competition 
Margrethe Vestager has presented the key issues in her speeches focused on competition in 
the big data world. While acknowledging the benefits of digital economy and data sharing, 
Vestager raised several questions and concerns on how big data can conversely hurt 
competition. “A company might even buy up a rival just to get hold of its data, even though 
it hasn't yet managed to turn that data into money. We are therefore exploring whether we 
need to start looking at mergers with valuable data involved, even though the company that 
                                                 
1133-1135. Available at: <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2834611>; COMP/M.7212. 
Facebook/WhatsApp. 2014, para. 47 
3 STUCKE, M. E., GRUNES, A. P. No Mistake About It: The Important Role of Antitrust in the Era of Big 
Data. 2015, p. 3. Available at: <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2600051> 
4 EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION SUPERVISOR. Report of workshop on Privacy, Consumers, 
Competition and Big Data. 2014, p. 1. Available at: <https://edps.europa.eu/sites/edp/files/publication/14-07-
11_edps_report_workshop_big_data_en.pdf> 
5 LAITENBERGER, J. Enforcing EU competition law in a time of change. “Is Disruptive Competition 
Disrupting Competition Enforcement?” Brussels, 2018, p. 7-8. Available at: 
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/text/sp2018_03_en.pdf> 
6 EUROPEAN COMMISSION. Commission Staff Working Document. Report on Competition Policy 2016. 






owns it doesn't have a large turnover…” as pointed out by Margrethe Vestager.7 The 
Commission together with the competition authorities in Europe are therefore beginning to 
intensively discuss the operation of merger control and analyse implications of a data-driven 
mergers on competition.8 Furthermore, the Commission has been actively engaged in 
competition-related international fora, such as the Competition Committee of the OECD, 
which will be likewise considered in this thesis.9 
 
Quoting former Vice President of the Commission responsible for Competition policy 
Joaquín Almunia, “Competition enforcement must evolve at all times to stay relevant and 
fulfil its goals.”10 Competition law and merger control need to reflect the present market 
development. The importance of data in the current economic environment cannot be 
underestimated. Data is becoming one of the most important assets in the digital economy, 
therefore it is necessary to evaluate its implications carefully when it comes to data-driven 
concentrations. Competition authorities need to develop tools to properly assess data-driven 
mergers and identify data-driven strategies that could likely yield procompetitive efficiencies 
or on the other hand, impede effective competition.11  
 
This thesis firstly provides the introduction into the background and outlines the main 
characteristics of “big data” concept, whereby manifesting the growing significance of data 
used as an asset in the present digital economy. The subsequent chapter focuses on the 
competitive concerns possibly arising once the proposed transaction involves merging 
potentially valuable datasets. The research considers specific features of data and explores to 
what extent these characteristics are prone to amplify or, on the contrary, mitigate the 
                                                 
7 VESTAGER, M. Big Data and Competition. EDPS-BEUC Conference on Big Data, Brussels, 2016. Available 
at: <https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/2014-2019/vestager/announcements/big-data-and-
competition_en> 
8 EUROPEAN COMMISSION. Press release. Mergers: Commission seeks feedback on certain aspects of EU 
merger control. Brussels, 2016. Available at: <https://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-3337_en.pdf> 
9 EUROPEAN COMMISSION. Op. cit. 6, p. 36 
10 ALMUNIA, J. Developments in EU Competition Policy. Athens, 2014. Available at: 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-14-312_en.htm> 






competitive concerns of data in the context of merger controls. The following chapters aim 
to provide the outline and clarification of the basic principles of data-related theories of harm 
first theoretically, and then applied in practise. The core analysis in the fifth chapter attempts 
to determine the principles, anomalies, consistency of decision-making, and the overall 
approach of the Commission towards unconventional data-driven merger cases. Each sub-
chapter firstly introduces the parties and background of each case, followed by the critical 
assessment of identified theories of harm with reference to big data. The master thesis is 
completed with a conclusion that summarises the main findings and seeks to provide an 
answer to the research question formulated below. 
 
The author is aware of the growing competition law, data protection law and consumer 
protection law overlaps. Nevertheless, the ultimate objective of competition policy is 
consumer welfare as constituted in, inter alia, the EU Merger Regulation12 and the Merger 
Guidelines13. Adhering to the topic and classification of this master thesis, the author will not 
further analyse issues that might be considered to be on the intersection or beyond the scope 
of European competition law. Having said that, the author is further aware of the novelty, 
complexity and continuous development of big data in competition law topic, which provides 
for numerous other related questions and issues that the scope of the master thesis does not 
allow to comprehend exhaustively and in detail. 
                                                 
12 “It is possible that the efficiencies brought about by the concentration counteract the effects on competition, 
and in particular the potential harm to consumers, that it might otherwise have and that, as a consequence, the 
concentration would not significantly impede effective competition…” COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN 
UNION. Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between 
undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation). OJ L 24. 2004, Recital 29 
13 “Effective competition brings benefits to consumers, such as low prices, high quality products, a wide 
selection of goods and services, and innovation. Through its control of mergers, the Commission prevents 
mergers that would be likely to deprive customers of these benefits by significantly increasing the market power 
of firms.” “The relevant benchmark in assessing efficiency claims is that consumers (105) will not be worse off 
as a result of the merger.” EUROPEAN COMISSION. Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers 
under the Council Regulation on the control of concentrations between undertakings. OJ C 31. 2004, para. 8, 
79 
Essentially similar statements can be found in: EUROPEAN COMISSION. Guidelines on the assessment of 
non-horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of concentrations between undertakings. 






1.1 RESEARCH QUESTION 
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate how the current merger control deals with the 
ongoing concerns of big data in the context of data-driven concentrations. The objective is 
to analyse whether newly created datasets of merged entities could lead to the increased 
market power of the newly formed concentration or could have detrimental effects on other 
competitors on the market or the competition itself, eventually constituting a recognized 
theory of harm. Furthermore, the thesis analyses how particular characteristics of big data 
can, by contrast, mitigate its competitive concerns. The idea is to analyse and establish 
whether big data could, in general, be a competitive concern. The analysis is further 
accompanied by the overview and analysis of merger decisions adopted by the Commission 
in the last years, where the competitive implications of data were to some extent addressed. 
The development of how the Commission tackles the novel issues in the application of 
merger control rules to the digital sector is inferred.  
 
This master thesis intends to at least theoretically conclude whether big data in its essence 
tend not to be a competitive concern in data-driven concentration within dynamic markets 
or, on the other hand, ought to lead to a data-related concentration being declared 
incompatible with a common market. 
 
1.2 METHODOLOGY 
The author uses mainly descriptive and analytical method to at least partly answer research 
questions by reviewing applicable laws, practises and decisions especially of EU 
Commission (de lege lata). The descriptive part is accompanied by the analysis and critical 
assessment of the law as it is. 
 
The author examined different types of sources throughout the conducted research. The 
primary sources used are jurisprudence, mainly studies made by EU competition authorities, 





Commission Staff Working Documents, speeches of notable European Commissioners, 
articles and analyses of Commission officials, supported by reports from organisations, 
books, academic articles and research papers concerning competition law in general or in 
connection with big data. The core source used for the analysis of the Commission’s practises 
are merger decisions concluded by the Commission. Furthermore, the EU legislation, mainly 
the EU Merger Regulation and other EU soft law are to some extent analysed and used as 





















2 DATA IN THE “DIGITAL ECONOMY” 
2.1 BIG DATA 
2.1.1 GENERAL 
The term big data lacks a common single definition, neither has it been recognised as a legal 
term. For the past decade, it has been assigned several different and inconsistent meanings. 
In a broader sense, it is used to refer to large amounts of datasets that are complex, 
heterogeneous, and the size of which is beyond the ability of a conventional statistical 
software or a computational tool to work with.14 Data might be provided voluntarily (for most 
commonly for “free” services on e-platforms or when using other forms of IT-based 
services), might be observed (user generated data by cookies, tracking web surfing, sensor 
data) or derived (from other data).15 Here the question presents itself - what is the threshold 
when data becomes big data? Is it 100 gigabytes? Or is it 100 petabytes? 
 
The general consent is that the size itself does not suffice to depict the essence of big data. 
The corresponding perspective of big data that goes beyond its size and characteristics was 
further articulated by Competition Commissioner Margrethe Vestager in her speech on “Data 
as Power” event, stating that “… What matters isn't just the amount of data. It's whether you 
can really use it to drive your rivals out of the market.” Vestager formulated the 
Commission’s opinion on big data saying that competition concerns arise not only when a 
company collects a lot of certain type of data, but rather when the data is unique, cannot be 
                                                 
14 OECD. Data-Driven Innovation for Growth and Well-Being: Interim Synthesis Report. 2014, p. 11. Available 
at: <https://www.oecd.org/sti/inno/data-driven-innovation-interim-synthesis.pdf> 
15 Furthermore, also government data ("open data"), i.e. personal or non-personal data collected by public sector 
bodies. In: LUNDQVIST, B. Big Data, Open Data, Privacy Regulations, Intellectual Property and Competition 
Law in an Internet of Things World - The Issue of Access. 2017, p. 2. Available at: 
<https://ssrn.com/abstract=2891484>; KERBER, W. Digital Markets, Data, and Privacy: Competition Law, 
Consumer Law, and Data Protection. In: Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht. Internationaler Teil 





duplicated, and can be used to foreclose other competitors.16 The Commission also 
contributed to the OECD session on big data in 2016, where Cyril Ritter, Directorate-General 
for Competition official, addressed the essential claims about the implications of data for 
competition law enforcement. On behalf of the Commission, Ritter similarly declared as one 
of the issues the fact that some online service providers collect large amounts of data to 
improve their products, and thus accumulate an insurmountable advantage over competitors. 
In this case, the Commission suggests treating data as any other input; but before any 
interventions, it is crucial to identify whether data is a key element for product success, 
whether data is replicable or available from other sources, and how quickly data becomes 
outdated.17 
 
On the basis of the aforementioned, it can be inferred that the Commission’s perspective of 
the source of data-related competitive concerns goes beyond the characteristics, size or 
amount of data. Nevertheless, a recognition of big data’s fundamental attributes eventually 
formed a universally accepted definition of big data that to some extent describes its 
challenges. It has been settled that even though big data can have various definitions 
depending on the context it is placed in, the concept of big data can be generally captured by 
four V’s definition: the volume of data, the velocity at which data is collected, the variety of 
information aggregated, and the value of data.18 Sometimes it goes even beyond and adds 
fifth or even more V’s to the characteristics, such as variability, veracity, validity or others.19 
For the purpose of this thesis, the author will further elaborate on four primary recognised 
V’s of the big data’s definition. 
                                                 
16 VESTAGER, M. Making Data Work for Us. Copenhagen, 2016. Available at: 
<https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/2014-2019/vestager/announcements/making-data-work-
us_en> 
17 RITTER, C. EU Competition Law, Personal Data, And Big Data. OECD Discussion on “Big Data: Bringing 
competition policy to the digital era, Paris, 2016. Available at: 
<https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP/M(2016)2/ANN2/FINAL/en/pdf> 
18 OECD. Op. cit. 14, p. 11;  
AUTORITÉ DE LA CONCURRENCE & BUNDESKARTELLAMT. Competition Law and Data. 2016, p. 4. 
Available at: <http://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/doc/reportcompetitionlawanddatafinal.pdf> 







The volume of data is the original attribute, on which the concept of big data was built on. It 
refers to the vast amounts of data generated in the digitalized world at every second to the 
point, where the size of data becomes a problem and is beyond the capability of conventional 
database software tools to capture, store, and analyse.20 The remarkable expansion of data is 
driven by various factors. One of the reasons is that technological innovations have reduced 
the cost of creating, collecting, managing and storing data. It is, therefore, less problematic 
for companies to acquire and exploit information about their consumers.21 Another 
contribution to the volume of data is that consumers themselves provide, actively or 
passively, more personal information due to the widespread popularity of e-commerce, social 
networks or smartphones.22 Furthermore, we are currently experiencing the Internet of 
Things23, where millions of devices are regularly connected to the Internet, acquiring even 
more information in various fields of healthcare, education, financial services, retail, 
government, transportation, at our homes, schools, work or anywhere else. 
 
The amount of data collected is growing significantly and the forecasts predict it to be 
exponentially growing in the years ahead. Cisco released a report predicting that driven by 
the Internet of Things, the total amount of data created (and not necessarily stored) by any 
device will reach 847 zettabytes24 per year by 2021, reaching an increase of nearly 288,5 
                                                 
20 OECD. Op. cit. 14, p. 11. 
21 OECD. Op. cit. 14, p. 8-10; OECD. Supporting Investment in Knowledge Capital, Growth and Innovation. 
In: OECD Publishing. 2013, p. 321. Available at: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264193307-en> 
22 OECD. Big Data: Bringing Competition Policy to the Digital Era. 2016, p. 6. Available at: 
<https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP(2016)14/en/pdf>; STUCKE, M. E., GRUNES, A. P. Op. cit. 11, 
p. 17-18. 
23 “IoT refers to an ecosystem in which applications and services are driven by data collected from devices that 
sense and interface with the physical world. In the Internet of Things, devices and objects have communication 
connectivity, either a direct connection to the internet or mediated through local or wide area networks.” In: 
OECD. The Internet of Things: Seizing the Benefits and Addressing the Challenges. 2016, p. 9. Available at: 
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5jlwvzz8td0n-en> 






percent from 2016 when the total amount of data created reached 218 zettabytes.25 Hence the 
term “big data”. As an illustration, the total amount of data stored on the Internet in 2004 was 
1 petabyte.26 The idea is that companies are collecting and leveraging large volumes of data 
in order to turn it into some form of business advantage and improve their end product’s 
quality. However, with massive amounts of data comes a number of challenges, such as cost, 
scalability and performance related to its storage, access, and processing in a timely fashion.27 
 
2.1.3 VELOCITY 
The velocity is the dimension of big data that refers to the increasing speed at which data is 
being generated, accessed, processed and analysed and the pace, at which data moves from 
one point to the next.28 The main challenge of most companies nowadays is to match the 
speed of processing with the speed of information generation and get real-time decision-
making power to maximize benefits they want to extract. Otherwise, using even a few hours 
late information might have detrimental consequences for some businesses. Keeping up with 
the production rate of data and processing of data in real-time is a particular goal of big data 
analytics.29 
 
Real-time big data processing is used in various areas, such as social networks, fraud 
detection or healthcare so that companies can react to changing patterns in the business in 
real-time. For instance, real-time processing in commerce can help optimize customer service 
                                                 
25 CISCO. Cisco Global Cloud Index: Forecast and Methodology, 2016–2021 White Paper. 2018, p. 1. 
Available at:  <https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/solutions/collateral/service-provider/global-cloud-index-
gci/white-paper-c11-738085.html> 
26 One zettabyte equals 1,048,576 petabytes. CSG Network Memory and Storage Converter. Available at: 
<http://www.csgnetwork.com/memconv.html> 
27 ALTINTAS, I. Characteristics of Big Data – Volume. Available at: <https://www.coursera.org/learn/big-
data-introduction/lecture/YoAYs/characteristics-of-big-data-volume> 
28 OECD. Op. cit. 14, p. 11 






processes, update inventory and price, detect customer purchasing patterns, and provide 
greater customer satisfaction.30 
 
2.1.4 VARIETY 
The variety as the third dimension of big data refers to the increased diversity of data. Today, 
a much wider variety of data is being collected, stored and analysed to solve real-world 
problems. There are many different types of data we encounter every day (such as text data, 
image data, network data, geographic maps or social media apps), different sources 
generating data and different media delivering data. Through the fusion of different forms of 
data new information and facts can emerge. Based on newly generated data companies can 
better target individuals with behavioural advertising, track their preferences and in general 
improve profiles of their consumers.31 
 
Data’s heterogeneity is connected to its volume and value – more sources of data means more 
varieties of data, which means that it is tougher to derive value from the data because every 
different format and model needs to be processed in a different way. 
 
2.1.5 VALUE 
The fourth dimension of data refers to the worth of data extracted and is both a cause and a 
consequence of the increase in volume, velocity and variety.32 Big data’s value is derived 
from big analytics, which is defined as “technical means to extract insights, and the 
empowering tools to better understand, influence or control the data objects of these 
insights”. The insights could, for example, be about individuals, organisations, natural 
phenomena or the society overall.33 The technical means and empowering tools include 
                                                 
30 OECD. Op. cit. 14, p. 31 
31 STUCKE, M. E., GRUNES, A. P. Op. cit. 11, p. 21-22 
32 OECD. Op. cit. 22, p. 6 





algorithms that could access and analyse vast amounts of data and so-called machine-learning 
based on the capability of computers to teach themselves tasks by processing large datasets 
and increasingly resembling the human brain.34 
 
By means of big analytics, big data’s value is derived from the other three V’s. The volume 
of data enables companies to extract correlations from large, unstructured datasets with 
simple algorithms (which is said to perform better than cleaner datasets with more 
sophisticated algorithms but based on less data). Furthermore, the ability to derive further 
information increases with the wider variety of data once they are fused and linked. That is 
to say, data fusion enables to infer personal information even from seemingly anonymous or 
non-personal data. Finally, the velocity of data consisting in (near to) real-time processing 
enables companies to promptly react to market changes and be the first to collect, analyse 
data and use gathered data, thus gaining first- or early-mover advantage.35 
 
The value may be the most important V of big data since simply having access to large 
amounts of data is useless unless companies have the incentive and ability to turn them into 
value. 
 
2.2 PERSONAL DATA 
For the clarification and understanding of the relationship and difference between big data 
and personal data, a brief introduction into personal data needs to be included. Big data is 
more than personal data; it also includes accumulated and anonymous data. However, it is 
rare for data generated by user activity to be completely and irreversibly anonymised. Big 
data sets often include personal data, and in many cases, it is difficult to separate the personal 
data from non-personal data. The main idea behind big data is to reveal relationships within 
and amongst the information through processing and analytics. While many benefits arise 
                                                 
34 STUCKE, M. E., GRUNES, A. P. Op. cit. 11, p. 23 





from these processing operations, once personal data are involved, there are implications for 
privacy and data protection. 
 
Privacy and data protection in EU are going to reach a significant milestone in the year 2018. 
The Council of European Union together with the Commission established new EU data 
protection regime by adopting the General Data Protection Regulation36, the primary rule for 
processing personal data in EU law, designed to harmonize data and privacy law across EU, 
empower and protect all EU citizens from privacy and data breaches in the data-driven world, 
and alter the way organizations across the region approach data privacy.37 
 
GDPR defines personal data as “any information relating to an identified or identifiable 
natural person”38, similarly as treated in the previously valid Directive39. The Regulation 
further defines the processing of such data as “any operation or set of operations which is 
performed on personal data or on sets of personal data, whether or not by automated means” 
and provides a non-exhaustive list of such operations.40 
 
2.3 DATA AS AN ASSET 
The digital economy is marked by billions of everyday online connections among 
individuals, businesses, devices, processes, not least data. It is not a new phenomenon that 
                                                 
36 EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND COUNCIL. Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal 
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Regulation). OJ L 119. 2016. 
37 See also EU GDPR Portal. Available at: <https://www.eugdpr.org/key-changes.html> 
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all sectors of today’s digital economy recognize an exponential rise in the value of data and 
data analytics, and an enormous increase in computing power and data storage capacity. The 
use of big data for creative and innovative purposes, known as data-driven innovation41, has 
however revolutionized the way to generate, process, share, and commercially exploit data.42 
Being able to harness big data can generate and raise important economic efficiencies for 
businesses that may, in turn, benefit consumers and society in general. Big data, therefore, 
represents a core economic asset with the potential to create a significant competitive 
advantage for companies.43 
 
Big data can be used in many ways to create value across various sectors of the global 
economy that it has reached to this day. Competition Commissioner Margrethe Vestager 
recognized data as a valuable asset that “… companies can use to understand their 
environment in a way they never could before” back in January 2016 in her “Competition in 
a big data world” speech, and even identified data as “a new currency”.44 Data can be a 
product, an input for some product or even commercially irrelevant.45 Online platforms track 
user activity on their websites and collect demographical, behavioural, and other data from 
users in order to improve the quality of their services and to monetize them effectively 
through targeted advertising. Furthermore, the collection of user locational data has become 
common with the growth of smartphones, laptops and tablet devices that allows tracking its 
user’s location at any time. Not only does the collection of data benefit online companies, it 
serves the similar purpose for offline companies as well. Brick and mortar businesses can 
observe customers’ activity and behaviour, gather their data through, for instance, retailer 
loyalty cards, credit card payments or smartphone apps with the purpose to detect customer 
shopping patterns and traffic data.46 Companies can thus generate a comprehensive profile, 
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based on which they can address the actual target audience with tailored ads and services, i.e. 
use behavioural targeting.47 Other efficiencies derived from the use of big data include 
enhanced production processes, improved decision-making, and market trend forecasts. 
 
Access to the collection of data can be used not only to benefit companies to gain efficiencies 
and improve their businesses but also to exploit customers in a negative way. Companies 
may apply targeted advertising to the most vulnerable customers or discriminate unprofitable 
ones with different prices, opportunities or conditions. Customers may also be unaware of 
how much more information they leave behind than they intend to. Furthermore, users emit 
digital exhaust, or trace data, that leaves a trail of information, such as geographical 
coordinates of a smartphone or IP address in a server log, the value of which is often unknown 
to the user. Through big analytics and amalgamation of such information trails, companies 
can discern and reveal more about individuals.48 
 
On the other hand, it is not only companies that consider data as an asset. People themselves 
consider personal data their property and use it as a commodity. Consumers search for free 
products and services more often these days. Companies, therefore, market their goods as 
(seemingly) free instead of charging a discouraging fee. What actually happens is that 
consumers pay with their personal information for goods and services marketed as free; the 
phenomenon that was recognized both by Competition Commissioner Vestager, European 
Data Protection Supervisor Hustinx and Commission officials.49 
 
                                                 
47 AUTORITÉ DE LA CONCURRENCE & BUNDESKARTELLAMT. Op. cit., p. 10 
48 STUCKE, M. E., GRUNES, A. P. Op. cit. 11, p. 28 
49 VESTAGER, M. Competition in A Big Data World. Munich, 2016. Available at: 
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The incentive and the ability to collect, analyse and exploit data for business purposes have 
never been stronger. The idea of data being claimed to be “the new oil of the internet and the 
new currency of the digital world” was first formulated by former European Commissioner 
for Consumer Policy Meglena Kuneva back in 2009.50 Three years later, at that time Vice 
President of the European Commission responsible for Competition Policy Joaquín Almunia 
emphasised that companies more and more relied on data to improve their businesses and it 
seemed like data was becoming their most valuable intangible asset.51 As a result, the healthy 
competitive environment might become disturbed once the thin line between the sensible 
commercial use of personal data and the abuse of such information is crossed. Additionally, 
protection of personal data is freedom enshrined in Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union.52 Nevertheless, transfer of personal data has no boundaries. Within 
fractions of seconds, it is possible to send, copy, and process large data sets of personal 
information via the internet. It is, therefore, necessary to protect individuals from 
unwarranted access and exploitation of their private personal information when the 
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3 COMPETITIVE CONCERNS REGARDING DATA IN 
CONTEXT OF MERGERS 
3.1 GENERAL 
Data is unique in its own way and of relative importance depending on the context and the 
market. As data presents a valuable asset for many companies, the concerns arose that the 
concentration of data within the control of merging companies may lead to the risk of abuse 
and distortion of competition, as suggested by Joaquín Almunia, former Vice President of 
the Commission responsible for Competition Policy.53 The possession of big data presents 
particular challenges to competition law enforcement, since it could in theory contribute to 
market power.  However, as Competition Commissioner Margrethe Vestager suggested “… 
we shouldn’t take action just because a company holds a lot of data. After all, data doesn't 
automatically equal power.”54 Competitive impact of data depends on many factors that 
competition authorities need to consider and evaluate on a case-by-case basis, depending on 
the data and depending on the market. 
 
3.2 DATA AND MARKET POWER 
As mentioned above, there are more ways how companies collect and use gathered data, as 
well as more potential impacts it might have. From the competition view, the ability of data 
collection to contribute to creating or maintaining companies’ market power might be one of 
the most interesting ones.55 
 
Generally, in economy the market power is defined as the ability to price above short-run 
marginal cost and, in the long run, above average total cost. Short-run marginal cost is the 
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increase in total costs of a company caused by increasing its output by one extra unit while 
average total cost is the average costs related to the production of one only unit.56 As 
explained by Jones and Sufrin, there are two methods how to measure company’s market 
power, “direct” and “indirect”. The direct method is based on using econometric methods, in 
particular, the residual demand curve, i.e. the demand curve facing only one company 
(demand not met by other companies in the market). The indirect method estimates the 
market power using a structural approach that consists of several steps, the definition of a 
relevant market and the barriers to entry analysis being of crucial importance. Barriers to 
entry play a significant role when it comes to measuring company’s market power by the 
indirect method since they allow the company to earn monopoly profits by preventing other 
competitors from entering the market.57 Since EU competition authorities, together with the 
Commission and the European Court of Justice use the indirect method, this thesis will 
subsequently analyse determination of the relevant market and barriers to entry in the context 
of data-driven mergers, while examining a role of market shares and concentration level 
indications in dynamic markets.58 
 
Even though many sectors and industries could be affected by collection and usage of huge 
amounts of data, the majority of such businesses are active in online services, such as social 
networking, search engines, or online retailing. Due to their economic characteristics, digital 
channels and devices used for market interactions and online businesses are often able to 
collect significantly more user data than brick and mortar companies nowadays. Therefore, 
the following analysis will focus primarily on companies active in online markets. 
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3.2.1 RELEVANT MARKET 
In the merger assessment, the Commission defines relevant product market in the terms of 
substitutability, or interchangeability. According to the Market Definition Notice published 
by the Commission, the relevant market depends on the determination of products or services 
in certain areas that are substitutes for one another.59 When it comes to products or services 
that are new or subject to ongoing technological developments, such as in data-related digital 
economy, using traditional mechanisms to define relevant market may be more challenging 
or even inapplicable.60  
 
3.2.1.1 DATA AS A TRADABLE ITEM 
Under current EU competition policy, a correct market definition generally requires an 
existence of both supply and demand for the given substitutable product or service. As long 
as the data is not traded, a relevant market for data cannot be established. When it comes to 
data, companies active on social networks, search engines, or e-commerce platforms 
collecting a great amount of data are most commonly using data only as an input, as opposed 
to selling or trading data to third parties. Since data only forms an intermediary product and 
no demand and supply exists, the substitutability of data cannot be assessed and therefore no 
relevant product marked can be identified.61 The approach is supported also by American 
practitioners claiming that only when data is actually sold to customers, providing it could, 
in theory, constitute a relevant market. By definition, if there are and will be no sales, there 
can be no competition.62 
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This was illustrated in Facebook/WhatsApp merger decision, where the Commission 
explicitly stated that it has not investigated any possible market definition with respect to the 
provision of data or data analytics services since neither Facebook nor WhatsApp was active 
in such markets. Facebook did not sell any of the collected user data nor provided data 
analytics services to third parties as a stand-alone product separate from the advertising space 
itself. WhatsApp did neither sell any form of advertising, nor it stored or collected data about 
its users that would be valuable for advertising purposes.63 Conversely, in case any of the 
parties had actually been active in the provision of data, the Commission might have further 
examined the relevant market definition potentially solely for big data. 
 
3.2.1.2 DATA AS AN INPUT 
Apart from defining a relevant market consisting of the big data itself, where such data is 
available for purchase, there is also another side of the same coin.  Where data itself is not a 
tradable item, it may nevertheless play an important role in the determination of market. 
Companies develop new products and services based almost entirely on new ways of 
monetizing databases of user data and user profiles, most of the time far apart from the initial 
purposes data was originally collected for. In such cases, defining an additional, wider data-
related market would enable the Commission and competition authorities to take into account 
another form of potential competition – particularly online platform providers competing in 
the market for data that can be utilized for enhancing the quality and relevance of their 
services.64 Such data market definition would thus reflect the nature of online platforms, 
which do not profit from selling their services or technology to consumers, but rather rely on 
gaining benefits from valuable information collected from their users. As a result, the idea of 
defining a relevant product market comprising data that may be useful for companies 
emerged.65 
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The discussion was launched by former US Federal Trade Commissioner Pamela Jones 
Harbour, when she suggested a new type of product market definition for data, separate and 
apart from markets for the services driven by these data, more precisely “a putative relevant 
product market comprising data that may be useful to advertisers and publishers who wish 
to engage in behavioural targeting.”66 This approach to the market definition would reflect 
accordingly the distinction between data collection and data usage and the actual marketplace 
reality, where often online-based companies derive great value from user data, far beyond 
the original purposes for which it was initially collected.67 Subsequently, Harbour proposed 
the idea in her speech in European Parliament stating that defining a market for user data 
may be unusual under traditional market definition principles, but it may better reflect how 
companies, their competitors, customers, and users interact in the real world.68 In addition, 
European Data Protection Supervisor also suggested defining two separate markets, one for 
the collection of data and the other for the use of data as an input, either to supply other 
services or to sell the data for processing to third parties.69  
 
On the other hand, there are some practitioners not in favour of this idea, claiming such 
market definition analysis around inputs like consumer data would become more complex, 
less accurate, and less predictable.70 Nevertheless, when it comes to the Commission actually 
conducting merger reviews, there is no shortage for defining a market around data sold to 
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customers71; the Commission has however not yet established a relevant product market for 
data used solely as input so far. 
 
3.2.2 MARKET SHARES 
Market shares and concentration (also “HHI”) levels provide useful first indications for 
identifying potentially problematic mergers. Both Horizontal and Non-Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines provide guidance on the competitive assessment conducted by the Commission 
and corresponding levels of market shares and concentration thresholds that are unlikely to 
raise competition concerns.72 The extent to which these factors could contribute to the 
increase of market power depends, among other things, on the characteristics and the 
conditions on the market itself. In the judgment of the General Court in Cisco and 
Messagenet73 case, in which Cisco challenged Microsoft’s takeover of Skype, the General 
Court expressed its opinion regarding the role of market share and HHI levels in dynamic 
markets, specific particularly for online businesses and companies collecting and analysing 
big data. The General Court shared the same view with the Commission regarding large 
market shares in recent and fast‑growing sectors characterised by frequent new market entries 
and short innovation cycles being potentially ephemeral. The General Court concluded that 
“… In such a dynamic context, high market shares are not necessarily indicative of market 
power and, therefore, of lasting damage to competition which Regulation No 139/2004 seeks 
to prevent.”74 
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The Commission adopted and relied on the General Court’s statement in its 
Facebook/WhatsApp decision.75 It emphasised the dynamic character of the consumer 
communications sector, where large market shares fluctuate very frequently, sometimes 
within weeks or months. The Commission explained such fluctuations by important factors 
including trendiness and coolness of apps perceived by groups of users that shape the 
competitive landscape.76 Furthermore, emerging concerns about privacy protection or even 
temporary service outages might affect the size of market shares stemming from the 
popularity and frequency of apps usage by its users.77 Portability of demand, i.e. so-called 
multi-homing, constituted another important factor considered by the Commission in data-
related merger cases and will be further analysed in the following subsection. 
 
Based on the analysis outlined by the General Court’s judgment and the Commission’s 
decision, the lower informative value of market shares in the dynamic environment of data-
related markets may be derived primarily from the volatility and inconstancy of such markets. 
Due to recurrent fluctuations, the past market shares may not fundamentally truly represent 
the effective competitive force of companies present on the market at the time of the 
Commission’s decision; consequently, there is a low degree of certainty that the 
Commission’s prediction regarding the future market structure in the two- to three-year time 
period usually considered to assess the potential effects of a merger will be valid.78 Similarly, 
OECD also questioned the appropriateness of market shares and concentration measures in 
specific kind of markets, such as for industries exhibiting rapid innovations where the 
markets are often unstable and change rapidly over time.79 
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3.2.3 BARRIERS TO ENTRY INDICATIVE OF MARKET POWER 
3.2.3.1 GENERAL 
A barrier to entry is something that prevents or hinders the emergence of a potential 
competitor which would otherwise constraint the incumbent company. The term “barriers to 
entry” is considered to include barriers to expansion that prevent or hinder an existing 
competitor from expanding output as well.80 As the Commission established, a merger is 
unlikely to pose any significant anti-competitive risk in case entering a market for other 
competitors is sufficiently easy. On the other hand, in markets with significant entry barriers, 
it is likely for a company to sustain its market power. For entry to be considered a sufficient 
competitive constraint on the merging parties, it must be shown to be likely, timely, and 
sufficient to deter or defeat any potential anti-competitive effects of the merger.81 Thus, the 
key issue in EU competition law is whether entry barriers are sufficiently low to reduce 
concerns about merger’s anti-competitive effects. 
 
According to Merger Guidelines, barriers to entry can take various forms. Taking into 
account only the traditional entry barriers, merging parties can argue that entry barriers, 
particularly in online industry, are generally low.82 Innovative competitors rapidly entering 
the market and displacing established companies with much greater data resources than 
themselves can serve as supporting the argument of low entry barriers.83 Furthermore, 
considering search engines as an illustration – they are free, easy to use, users can easily 
switch from one search engine to another, users are not locked-in by any data portability 
issues and no classic direct network effects have been identified so far. As a result, under 
these traditional factors, competition authorities might find no need to intervene as no entry 
barriers seem to arise. Therefore, competition authorities need to look beyond traditional 
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entry factors into those arising particularly in data-driven markets, such as network effect, 
scale, and scope of data or spill-over effects, as analysed further in sections below. Stucke 
and Grunes claim that there is no empirical support for concluding that entry barriers across 
online markets are either consistently low or high.84 
 
3.2.3.2 NETWORK EFFECTS 
Competition authorities are generally familiar with direct and indirect network effects. The 
direct network effects arise when the value and usefulness of the product or service increases 
with the number of users. A classic example is a telephone. As more people use telephones, 
the more people one can call, the more useful it is to actually own the telephone. The indirect 
network effects mean that once the usage of a product or service increases, the value of 
complementary ones increases as well. For instance, the more people use Apple’s operating 
system, the more will be invested in developing products compatible with this operating 
system, hence the popularity of the system will rise as well. Indirect network effects are, 
however, not necessarily symmetrical. As the advertisers might enjoy more users on the 
service, the reversed, that users value more advertisers and advertisement, might not be the 
case.85 
 
When it comes to network effects particularly in data-related markets, the Commission has 
expressed concerns about even stronger affects these network effects may have on the high-
tech markets. In Google case, the Commission observed that in online markets the network 
effects might lead to the dominant position of the company, which might consequently 
foreclose competitors and prevent other competitors from expanding their customer base.86 
Several competition officials have also highlighted the significant role the network effects 
play in digital services since they are essentially based on the interaction of the users through 
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a platform.87 OECD, although acknowledging benefits generated by network effects in digital 
markets, recognized their competitive concerns in relation to the strength and viability of 
competition itself. Furthermore, OECD observed there is a high risk that digital markets 
significantly affected by network effects might reach a tipping point, at which 
monopolisation to the detriment of the competition might become almost inevitable.88 
 
When it comes to network effects in already closed merger cases, the Commission observed 
in Facebook/WhatsApp case that no significant “traditional” entry barriers to enter the 
consumer communication app market were recognized.89 However, the merger did raise 
classic direct network effects in two product markets, texting apps and social networking, 
whose impact on competition post-merger needed to be assessed. As the Commission pointed 
out, network effects in online markets, in particular, may lead to the ability of the merged 
entity to foreclose competitors and make more difficult for competing providers to expand 
their customer base.90 Nevertheless, the Commission concluded that network effects do not 
constitute an ultimate barrier to competitor entry or expansion post-merger.91 The 
Facebook/WhatsApp decision supported the approach adopted in the earlier Microsoft/Skype 
case in the Commission’s decision92 and the General Court’s judgment93. Even so, European 
Commission officials emphasize that the mentioned decisions do not constitute a general rule 
and the Commission will carry out a case-by-case assessment of network effects in future 
merger cases.94 OECD came to the similar conclusion in its Interim Synthesis Report.95 
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3.2.3.3 SCALE OF DATA 
A second effect emerging in data-driven markets arises from the scale of data. The more 
people who actively or passively provide data, the more the company can improve its product 
or services, which in turn will likely attract more users, and the positive feedback continues.96 
The implications of the scale of data for markets were recognized also by Competition 
Commissioner Margrethe Vestager, saying “… Often what attracts users to a service isn't its 
price or any inherent quality, but how many other people use it. And sometimes data can be 
the most valuable asset a company owns.”97 As an illustration, the more people use a search 
engine, the more likely it learns to accurately predict consumers’ preferences, the more 
relevant and reliable the search results will be; thus, the search engine will ultimately attract 
more users. It is often described as “trial-and-error”, or “learning-by-doing” process, 
meaning the likelihood that the search engine provides relevant results increases with more 
searches by users themselves.98 So-called “click-and-query” data is considered to be a highly 
valuable input to deliver high quality search results.99 What needs to be emphasized is that 
knowing customers’ preferences resulting in the provision of better products or services is a 
trivial marketing rule. The Internet and information technologies introduced new quality into 
the business by making it possible to acquire, process and utilize data of enormous size, 
tremendously fast and in a long term – in a way never possible before. This makes current 
digital economy considerably novel in numerous courses compared to standard brick-and-
mortar and industrial businesses. 
 
The Commission recognized the scale of data as an important element of an effective 
competitor in its Microsoft/Yahoo! Search merger decision, stating that the newly merged 
entity could be able to provide greater relevance through greater scale.100 According to the 
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Commission’s analysis, the most important factors, based on which users choose a search 
engine, are the algorithmic search engines’ quality and relevance. As a result, the merged 
entity would be allowed to run more test and experiments on the algorithm, thus eventually 
improving its relevance.101 OECD shares the same opinion on this scale-based effect that can 
be output enhancing and recognizes the existence of positive feedback, stating that “… the 
accumulation of data can lead to significant improvements of data-driven services which in 
turns can attract more users leading to even more data that can be collected.” These 
feedbacks might reinforce company’s market position, and eventually lead to market 
dominance, or at least to market concentration.102 The opinion that a relatively large scale of 
data collection may positively promote the competitiveness of companies active in online 
markets was similarly expressed by German and French competition authorities in their joint 
report.103 
 
However, even though companies may perform better with an access to a larger scale of data 
post-merger, this claim is not indisputable. Timeliness of data is an important factor able to 
limit the competitive advantage of data-rich companies. The value of data is not consistent 
and may decrease rapidly in time. As a result, companies need new, updated data to ensure 
their results and predictions are precise and reliable; this being especially true for companies 
active in online industry and heavily relying on the timeliness of data, such as targeted 
advertising.104 Thereby, companies that are able to update data very frequently and collect 
new data in a very short time have a lasting advantage over its competitors. In addition, in 
case of huge search engines with a large number of search queries made on daily basis, the 
amount of data necessary to provide a relevant up to date result is even bigger. As reported 
by Google, 15 % of every day’s searches are queries never made before.105 
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Additionally, economic advantages depend not solely on large scale of data, but also on 
company’s technology to analyse accumulated amounts of data. If companies are not able to 
extract information and knowledge that they can use to improve a product or monetise 
services, data as such are worthless.106 As the Commission concluded in the 
Microsoft/Yahoo! Search decision, “while the Commission notes that Google appears to 
perform better in terms of relevance especially for [...] queries, this does not provide evidence 
that scale leads to higher relevance for users, since the above studies do not take into account 
the technology of the different search engine which are not related to scale.”107 
 
3.2.3.4 SCOPE OF DATA 
Besides the scale of data, companies can enjoy network effects from the scope of data. The 
value of the data might not only be inferred from the amount of collected data, but also from 
the variety of data describing particular users. The company can leverage differentiated data 
to improve its product or services to better target users with more personalized results. It is 
therefore no longer the trial-and-error, learning-by-doing from earlier queries, but trial-and-
error in forecasting individual user preferences from the variety of accumulated data, such as 
geo-location data, browser history, user’s emails or cookies.108 The more areas of interaction 
between a user and a provider exist, the more tailored the offered product or services can 
be.109 
 
Google can be an example of how the variety of data can amplify the other network effects. 
Google does not only aggregate data from everyone using its search engine but also from 
what videos they watch on YouTube, what they are writing in their Gmail accounts, what 
                                                 
106 SCHEPP, N.-P., WAMBACH, A. Op. cit., p. 122; AUTORITÉ DE LA CONCURRENCE & 
BUNDESKARTELLAMT. Op. cit., p. 48-49 
107 COMP/M.5727. Microsoft/Yahoo! Search business. 2010, para. 168 
108 STUCKE, M. E., GRUNES, A. P. Op. cit. 11, p. 186-189 
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their location is while using Google Maps, and a whole range of other information gathered 
from their use of Google’s Android phones. Although each of these data can separately be of 
value for various companies, the combination of data from Google’s different services and 
platforms allows it to generate knowledge on multiple aspects of user’s behaviour and 
preferences. Companies not operating on such broad platforms lack the variety of data 
acquired particularly by Google, thus reducing the possibility to provide more relevant 
products or services.110 
 
In its Google/DoubleClick merger decision, the Commission highlighted the significance of 
the scope of data as one of the factors determining the quality of collected data, alongside the 
sheer size of the datasets.111 Furthermore, the scope of data was discussed also in OECD’s 
report, in which it recognized the value of the diversification of services in leading to better 
“super-additive” insights. However, the crucial factor is the possibility to link data, 
conducing greater value and significance than the sum of isolated information.112 
 
3.2.3.5 CROSS-PLATFORM NETWORK EFFECTS 
Many online markets can be characterised as “multi-sided”, where companies have to 
compete simultaneously for more than one group of users or customers, such as search 
engines, social media networks, or online marketplaces. Within these platforms, two or more 
distinct groups are brought together, among which at least one group positively values the 
presence of the other.113 Multi-sided platforms can be transaction or non-transaction, 
depending on whether there is a direct transaction between the sides of the market. Social 
media networks are an example of a non-transaction platform, where users on one side use 
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the network for free without any interaction with the advertisers on the other side of the 
market, who make use of data provided by users themselves.114 
 
Multi-sided platforms are prone to be affected by the cross-platform network effect that refers 
to effects by which members of one user group on a network attract members of another user 
group.115 Generally, the cross-platform network effect occurs when an increasing number of 
users on one side of the multi-sided platform attracts more advertisers or suppliers on the 
other side, which successively enhances user demand for the platform because a greater scale 
of advertisers or suppliers can offer better personalized products and services.116 The cross-
platform network effect can be further amplified by the presence of data. Using the social 
network Facebook as an example, it can be observed how the growth of active users on the 
free side can spill over to the other side of the platform, attracting more advertisers who want 
to reach those users.117 
 
The aforementioned network effects and economies of scale and scope increase the 
possibility that a merger will give rise to a “tipping”.  This phenomenon refers to a situation 
where network effects may lead to a market being dominated by one product or service.118 
Some economists and lawyers argue that a market tipped due to networks effects caused by 
data-driven business conduct lacks the incentive of both dominant and ousted companies to 
further invest in innovation; that is because the ousted companies are aware of a dominant 
firm offering higher quality products and services, and having significantly lower marginal 
costs of innovation.119 However, a mere existence of such effects does not necessarily imply 
that the market will tip to a dominant provider and entrench a dominant platform.120  
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Having said that, a phenomenon called “multi-homing” can also have significant competitive 
implications. Multi-homing refers to the practise of participating on more platforms 
simultaneously.121 Users multi-home while utilizing multiple providers even for the same 
task, enabling multiple providers collecting data on the same users. Moreover, the demand 
side of providers or advertisers tends to multi-home as well placing advertisements and 
service offerings on multiple platforms to reach more users.122 Due to significant multi-
homing by users, rival providers have access to data from the same individual users, and 
access to user data is unlikely to create a material barrier to entry and competition. As a result, 
multi-homing reduces the competitive significance of cross-platform network effects, since 
it allows even networks with small scale to compete effectively.123 Furthermore, it reduces 
the tendency of a market to tip to a dominant platform.124 The Commission adopted similar 
conclusion in Facebook/WhatsApp merger decision stating that active multi-homing in 
communications apps ensures that the merged entity will not become an exclusive provider 
to its users and the market will still be open for competitors that are able to gain users even 
though the users stay on the merged entity’s network.125 
 
3.2.3.6 DISCLAIMER 
The existence of networks effects and economies of scale and scope is not tied to the presence 
of data on the market. Even if a company would not collect larger amounts of user data, it 
would be still able to operate in a multi-sided platform market with, for instance, users on the 
one side and advertisers on the other. In that case, advertisers would still benefit from a larger 
user base, users would probably still be subsidised by advertising and would still be inclined 
to products and services with more popularity and demand from other users. However, the 
above analysis aims to demonstrate how the use of data can amplify and enhance the 
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implications of network effects and economies of scale and scope on data-related markets. 
Consequently, the intensified positive feedback can be used to improve user targeting, hence 
better monetisation of services, and hence better services to the benefit of users. To conclude, 
even though data may not constitute a driving factor for the aforementioned effects, the 
author finds it important to disclose the presence of data collecting mainly on multi-sided 
platform markets might reinforce the relationship between platform sides and the market 
position of the company.126 
 
3.3 DATA CHARACTERISTICS MITIGATING ITS 
COMPETITIVE CONCERNS 
3.3.1 AVAILABILITY OF DATA 
The existence of data features that can contribute to a high availability of data may, 
eventually, reduce the risk that differentiated access to such data among competitors could 
harm competition.127 Non-rivalry of consumption refers to the degree to which the 
consumption of a resource affects the potential of the resource to meet the demands of others. 
Oil, for instance, is a pure rivalry good since it can be consumed only once.128 Data is, 
however, considered to be of a non-rivalrous nature. It implies that if one company has access 
to a piece of data, it does not prevent its competitors from acquiring the identical piece of 
data as well, because the same data can be sold many times to many companies, which can 
use the data even simultaneously and for different purposes; furthermore, the same 
information can be used multiple times by the same company without using it up.129 There is 
not one company in any sector who can, or does, control all of the data created in the world.  
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The similar concept holds for users. Previously mentioned multi-homing is a perfect 
illustration of how users themselves share their data even for the same service with multiple 
providers, none of which has any exclusivity on those data.130 However, if users were 
required to pay for each site, it would most likely prevent them from spending the same 
money on another site. But in today’s setting, users may furnish the basic information, such 
as age, email addresses, shopping habits, to as many sites as they wish without lowering their 
income.131 
 
In the context of the non-rivalrous nature of data, it has also been claimed that data is 
ubiquitous, inexpensive, widely available and easy to collect.132 Easy internet access almost 
everywhere and smartphone usage make sure that users are constantly generating data and 
leaving traces of their needs and preferences. Data brokers’ task is to collect as much data as 
possible to further sell it to companies that find it valuable. Government agencies provide 
some data even for free.133 As a result, the newly established company can acquire first data 
and tools and mechanisms for data storage and analysis already when it launches from third-
party sources. Having said that, companies can benefit from insights into consumers’ needs 
and preferences before any user has even interacted with their newly created platform. Data 
has, therefore, near-zero marginal costs for production and distribution.134 
 
3.3.1.1 FACTORS POTENTIALLY LIMITING DATA AVAILABILITY 
The characteristics of ubiquity, low cost, and wide availability make big data different from 
factors and aspects generally considered as prone to be anti-competitive. That, however, does 
not preclude the existence of a potential impediment to effective competition due to the data-
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related merger.135 Neither does it imply that data are accessible to all competitors, nor that 
individuals or companies cannot be excluded from utilisation of data. The French Autorité 
de la concurrence and the German Bundeskartellamt analysed various factors potentially 
limiting the availability feature of data in their joint paper that will be presented below.136 
 
Firstly, companies incurring high costs to collect and store data of a significant relevance 
obviously want to maintain an exclusive control over such data; thus, they may decide to 
limit its further use and forwarding to third parties.137 Excludability of data induces 
companies’ incentive to be first to gain access to particular data as it can result in a 
competitive advantage.138 
 
The second factor potentially reducing the level of data availability are various types of costs. 
Firstly, companies may need to incur high costs as investments to collect and use huge 
amounts of data. Such high level of fixed costs may prevent new entrants from using the 
same volume and variety of data compared to bigger incumbents. Secondly, as explained 
above, companies offer better product and services thanks to data from previous interactions 
with users enabling companies to learn users’ preferences and predict their behaviour. To 
access these data, companies need to establish a sufficiently large user base for themselves 
by offering services at the high quality level, which may require further investments, notably 
in research and development. 
 
Thirdly, using third parties’ data serves as an alternative to direct collection of data. These 
so-called data brokers accumulate information from several sources, such as their own data 
collection technology, tracking technologies on websites based on contracts with website 
owners, public authorities or third-party companies. Indeed, using intermediate access to data 
might be less costly due to lack of fixed costs. On the other hand, there might be several 
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disadvantages, such as limited scale or scope of data, specific costs due to technical 
constraints139, legal or contractual provisions that may prohibit or constrain the possibility to 
share data with third parties. 
 
To conclude, data-related mergers need a case-by-case analysis in order to determine all 
factors affecting the anti-competitive nature of the concentration through the availability of 
data. In cases where competition authorities believe that newly merged entity would end up 
acquiring and exploiting a dominant position, they may require merging companies to make 
data available to competitors.140 
 
3.3.2 SUBSTITUTABILITY OF DATA 
The substitutability of data is another aspect of data potentially decreasing the possibility of 
its anti-competitive implications. According to Horizontal Merger Guidelines, it is less likely 
that a merger will significantly impede effective competition, in particular through the 
creation or strengthening of a dominant position, when there is a high degree of 
substitutability between the products of the merging companies and those supplied by rival 
competitors.141 
 
Online platforms are quite distinguished and differentiated, hence the most useful and 
valuable data to one company does not necessarily mean the same to the other, even if they 
provide the same service. The level of relevance of particular data among platforms varies.142 
Because of that, what actually needs to be kept in mind is one particular of the four crucial 
“Vs” of big data, the variety of data. In the context of mergers, the value of the target’s 
company lies not in data the acquirer already owns, but rather in its varied and non-
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substitutable data. The issue with data-driven mergers, therefore, is whether a newly merged 
entity may likely, through acquiring access to a greater variety of data, attain or maintain 
significant market power, leverage its dominance into another market, or impede competition 
in any side of the multi-sided market in any way.143  
 
3.3.3 VALUE OF DATA 
The value of data has a limited span of life. The most recent information has generally higher 
value as it lessens considerably over time. Therefore, for a company to have a sustainable 
competitive advantage, it needs to continuously refresh the data in order to always possess 
real-time up to date information.144 As wisely pointed out by Competition Commissioner 
Vestager, “… It might not be easy to build a strong market position using data that quickly 
goes out of date. So, we need to look at the type of data, to see if it stays valuable.”145 Any 
competitive advantage from data is temporary and new entrants are not necessarily 
disadvantaged in relation to the incumbent when it comes to data collection and analysis. 
Conversely, it means that the incumbent is not necessarily benefitted by the possession of a 
large volume of data as velocity is needed to create the value of it.146  
 
It is important to note that not all data is commercially valuable and significant. However, 
even if the existence of machine-learning tool does make it easier to predict a value of data, 
it might not be able to do so in given context or in advance. Some academics believe that 
regulators assessing a merger should not speculate about some future value discovery.147 In 
addition, OECD conducted a research into the matter of the economic and social value of 
data and concluded that the estimations of value are highly context dependent. In the report, 
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OECD also emphasized the importance of network effects when determining the value of 
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4 THEORIES OF HARM RELATED TO DATA 
4.1 GENERAL 
When competition authorities allege that a proposed merger breaches competition rules, a 
well-developed theory of harm should be presented. A convincing theory of harm should be 
internally logically consistent and should articulate how the merger might harm competition 
and, ultimately, consumers. It should be consistent with the parties’ incentives and the 
available empirical evidence.149 There are several theories of harm related to data-driven 
mergers. 
 
4.2 COMBINATION OF DATA 
Referring to Merger Guidelines150, a traditional merger analysis concentrates on the 
substitutability of goods, whereas data-driven mergers may often revolve around the variety, 
i.e. non-substitutability of data as a potential source of market power.151 A strategic aim of a 
merger could be to acquire and better access additional data of another merging party, which 
can post-merger be linked and combined with company’s existing datasets. This might be a 
case not only in horizontal mergers but also in conglomerate mergers, where an access to a 
more heterogeneous and diverse data combination may strengthen the previously mentioned 
economies of scope.152 Eventually, the accumulation of merging parties’ datasets could result 
in a competitive advantage of a unique database, when companies might more easily improve 
their products and services post-merger in a way that competitors might not be able to 
match.153 In case there is not a possibility of competitors to replicate the information extracted 
from the data combination of the merged entity, competition authorities may have to assess 
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possible restraints of competition.154 The concerns that increased accumulation of data poses 
threats to a healthy competition environment were discussed in several merger cases, for 
instance, Google/DoubleClick, Telefónica UK/Vodafone UK/Everything Everywhere/JV and 
Microsoft/LinkedIn, which will be analysed below in the fifth chapter. 
 
4.3 INPUT FORECLOSURE 
Input foreclosure is a common concern in the context of data-driven mergers where data 
constitutes an important input for the downstream product. Within the meaning of the Non-
Horizontal Merger Guidelines, input foreclosure occurs when the newly merged entity is 
likely to restrict access to the data on the upstream market, which it would have supplied to 
the customers downstream absent the merger. It is not necessary to force competitors out of 
the market for the merger to give rise to a significant impediment of effective competition, it 
is enough that the increased input costs would lead to higher prices for the consumers.155 The 
Commission needs to establish three factors to constitute the input foreclosure theory of 
harm: the ability of the merging parties to foreclose its actual or potential competitors the 
access to input, the economic incentive to do so, and the overall likelihood of significant 
detrimental effect on competition, thus causing harm to consumers.156 In the assessment of 
the likeliness of input foreclosure scenario, the Commission assesses the effect on 
competition in the light of countervailing factors and efficiencies substantiated by the 
merging parties.157 
 
Input foreclosure can take various forms. The merger may allow the merging parties to 
increase the costs of downstream rivals in the market thereby leading to an upward pressure 
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on their sales prices, raise barriers to entry to potential competitors in case the merged entity 
would be likely not to supply potential downstream entrants, or only on less favourable terms 
than absent the merger and/or otherwise make conditions for downstream competitors to 
obtain data more difficult thereby significantly impeding effective competition.158 
 
TomTom/Tele Atlas, Telefónica UK/Vodafone UK/Everything Everywhere/JV, 
Publicis/Omnicom and Microsoft/LinkedIn merger decisions concerning analysis of potential 
input foreclosure theory of harm will be discussed below in the fifth chapter. 
 
4.4 DATA TO STRENGTHEN POSITION 
A merger of two companies in separate upstream and downstream markets, where they hold 
strong market positions, has the ability to prevent new competitors, or start-ups, from 
entering the market. The idea is to get control over potential new competitors by acquiring 
them before they increase their market power and pose too much competition or to make sure 
that other, already existing competitors do not acquire them sooner.159 Online service 
providers consuming big personal data may want to merge with software and hardware 
producers to gain access to downstream company’s valuable data-troves which they have 
collected from the users using their services and products.160 This type of acquisition can 
increase the incumbent’s market power and provide the ability to raise prices, reduce outputs 
and quality, thus harming competitors and, ultimately, consumers.161 
 
The major merger decisions dealing with this theory of harm were adopted in 
Facebook/WhatsApp and Microsoft/LinkedIn cases and will be discussed in greater detail 
below in the fifth chapter. 
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5 MERGER DECISIONS CONCERNING DATA IN THE 
AMBIT OF BIG DATA162 
 
5.1 TOMTOM/TELE ATLAS 
5.1.1 THE PARTIES AND BACKGROUND 
TomTom/Tele Atlas merger analysis was conducted in line with the Commission’s recently 
adopted Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines.163 TomTom, a manufacturer of portable 
navigation devices (“PNDs”) and a supplier of navigation software for use in navigation 
devices, launched an offer for all issued and outstanding publicly listed shares of Tele Atlas, 
one of two main suppliers of digital map databases for navigation and other end-uses, both 
in Europe and North America. The proposed transaction was considered a concentration 
within the meaning of EU Merger Regulation, nevertheless without a Community dimension 
since the parties did not meet the turnover thresholds. The concentration would, however, 
have been subject to investigation in four Member States; therefore, the referral of the 
proposed transaction to the Commission sent by TomTom was accepted. The proposed 
transaction was deemed to have the Community dimension and has been examined by the 
Commission.164 
 
The Commission defined an upstream market for digital map databases, i.e. a compilation of 
digital data used mostly for address location, route planning and navigation, and a 
downstream market for navigation devices including PNDs. The key competition concern 
was whether the vertical integration of TomTom and Tele Atlas would potentially 
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significantly impede competition, in the light of TomTom’s strong position on the market for 
PNDs and the duopoly market for navigable digital maps, consisting of Tele Atlas and 
NAVTEQ.165 
 
5.1.2 INPUT FORECLOSURE 
As likewise articulated in the Annual Report on Competition Policy 2008 and the 
accompanying Commission Staff Working Document, the key competition concern in the 
proposed merger of TomTom and Tele Atlas was the likelihood of anti-competitive vertical 
input foreclosure.166 The Commission assessed this theory of harm by examining whether 
the merged entity would prevent other PND providers from competing with TomTom by 
engaging in various strategies, such as lower quality map databases or their increased prices, 
or delay in the availability of new features and updates. The merging parties’ rationale of the 
merger was, however, to bring efficiencies, namely “better maps – faster”.167 
 
Regarding the likelihood of input foreclosure scenario, the Commission came to the 
conclusion that the merged entity would be likely to acquire the ability to foreclose 
competing manufacturers of PNDs and software manufacturers either by increasing the 
prices, providing maps in degraded quality or by delaying updates. The conclusion was based 
on three supporting arguments. Firstly, the merged entity’s significant degree of market 
power in the upstream market for navigable digital map databases (Tele Atlas sold map 
databases above marginal a cost, had market share of over 50% and had only one competitor 
with similar coverage and product quality level); secondly, the input constituting an 
important input for the downstream market (the navigable digital map databases being 
considered critical components for the production of PNDs); thirdly, no sufficient, timely 
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and effective counter-strategies from competing companies or new entrants eliminating the 
ability of merged entity to foreclose access to input (other competitors in the upstream market 
did not constitute enough constraints on Tele Atlas, nor would a new entry on the market be 
likely possible, and the licences intermediaries had with both companies, granting them more 
favourable conditions irrespective of the merger, only represented a third of the market).168 
 
Furthermore, the Commission also assessed the incentive of the merged entity to engage in 
input foreclosure scenario. Based on the calculations and tests conducted by the Commission, 
the merged entity would not have the incentive to adopt total foreclosure strategy (restrict 
supplying map databases to competitors altogether) or partial foreclosure strategy (increasing 
prices or degrading the quality of map databases supplied to competitors) in a manner that 
would lead to anti-competitive effects on the downstream market.  Furthermore, the parties 
argued that integrating TomTom’s data to improve Tele Atlas’ map databases would create 
significant efficiencies. Confronting the paragraph 47 of the Non-Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines, “a merger will raise competition concerns because of input foreclosure when it 
would lead to increased prices in the downstream market thereby significantly impeding 
effective competition” and based on all of the above, the Commission concluded that it would 
be unlikely that the proposed merger would significantly impede competition to the detriment 
of end-users. The decision did not rely on efficiencies arising out of the merger; the 
Commission, however, noted that taking into account efficiencies would only further 
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5.2.1 THE PARTIES AND BACKGROUND 
The Google/DoubleClick merger “generated considerable public interest as it concerned the 
ubiquitous search engine that most Europeans use in their daily lives”, contemplated in the 
Commission Staff Working Document accompanying the Report on Competition Policy 
2008.170 The Google/DoubleClick merger was one of the first instances where the 
Commission incorporated big data considerations into the merger assessment.171 Google 
operated free of charge internet search engine and provided free functionalities and web-
based software, such as searches facilitating toolbar, Gmail, Google Maps, YouTube, etc. 
The most profitable service was, however, providing online advertising space on its own 
websites as well as on partner websites. DoubleClick was a leading provider of ad serving, 
management, and reporting technology, accompanied by ad exchange platform and search 
engine management agency. Google was to acquire all of the shares of the parent holding 
company owning DoubleClick, which constituted a concentration. The proposed transaction 
did not meet the turnover thresholds and lacked Community dimension; nevertheless, the 
concentration was capable of being reviewed under the national competition laws of five 
Member States, none of which opposed the referral to the Commission. Therefore, the 
proposed concentration was deemed to have a Community dimension and was assessed under 
EU competition law.172 
 
5.2.2 COMBINATION OF DATA 
The Commission investigated foreclosure scenario resulting from the combination of 
Google’s and DoubleClick’s data assets. From a factual point of view, the merged entity 
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could use IP addresses, cookie IDs and connection times to figure out which search terms 
were used and what websites were visited, which could result in individual users’ search 
histories to be linked with past behaviour on the internet. Combining both data collections 
could be afterwards used to better target ads to users, eventually allowing the merged entity 
to achieve a position not replicable by competitors.173 
 
The parties dismissed this theory claiming existing contracts with advertisers prevented the 
use of data for behavioural targeting. Regarding the Commission’s arguments about possible 
contract modifications or renegotiations, the parties claimed that there are no incentives for 
DoubleClick to renegotiate those provisions as their non-neutral position as a service 
provider could prompt customers to switch to a rival competitor; and they have no ability to 
renegotiate either, since advertisers do not have an interest in other advertisers having access 
to their data. Even if of a contractual change occurred, the type of data collected by 
DoubleClick was not considered an essential input for profitable online advertising resulting 
in a competitive advantage, as it was already available to competitors and could be accessed 
through third-party data collectors or internet service providers. The Commission, therefore, 
concluded that combining Google’s and DoubleClick’s datasets was unlikely to squeeze out 
competitors and enable them to charge higher prices for their intermediation services.174 The 
decision was repeatedly sustained and confirmed by Competition Commissioner Margrethe 
Vestager in her “Making data work for us” speech in Copenhagen in 2016.175 
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5.3 TELEFÓNICA UK/VODAFONE UK/EVERYTHING 
EVERYWHERE 
5.3.1 THE PARTIES AND BACKGROUND 
Telefónica UK, Vodafone UK, together with Everything Everywhere notified the 
Commission of a proposed merger where the three parties would acquire joint control over a 
newly created company constituting a joint venture. The merged entity would provide 
various mobile commerce services to the merging parties or third party mobile operators. The 
merging companies would hold 33,3% of the shares and the possibility to exercise decisive 
influence through negative control in the joint venture. The joint venture was considered a 
full-functioning joint venture performing the functions of an autonomous economic entity on 
a long-lasting basis, thus constituting it a concentration within the meaning of EU Merger 
Regulation. The proposed merger fulfilled turnover thresholds requirements and had the 
Community dimension.176 
 
“Mobile commerce is a nascent sector that may radically change the consumer buying 
experience in the next few years. The proposed joint venture is one of several initiatives to 
develop the sector in Europe. The Commission is keen on promoting innovation in this area 
and ensuring that the markets remain open so that a number of competing solutions can 
emerge without undue obstacles, to the benefit of consumers.” Joaquín Almunia, former 
Commission Vice President in charge of Competition policy.177 
 
5.3.2 COMBINATION OF DATA AND INPUT FORECLOSURE 
Apart from its core activities, the joint venture would also provide data analytics services 
involving data collected from its other activities. The joint venture would rely on three 
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sources of data, namely basic customer data collected by mobile network operators, data 
gathered via users’ “mobile wallets” and data acquired on the basis of contracts with 
merchants. The concern was that the joint venture company would use merged data and data 
acquired by its own other services and analyse it all in order to provide its customers with 
valuable insights into customer behaviour. The Commission therefore investigated whether 
by merging a wide range of consumer data from various sources (personal information, 
location data, social behaviour data, browsing data, etc.), the joint venture would generate a 
unique, non-replicable database constituting an essential input for targeted mobile 
advertising. As a result, the joint venture would cause a foreclosure of competing providers 
of data analytics or targeted advertising services, meaning that other providers of mobile 
advertising services might be dependent on the joint venture or might be unable to 
compete.178 
 
The Commission claimed that since customers are inclined to provide their personal data to 
many companies active on the market, information available to the joint venture was, to a 
large extent, likewise accessible to existing or new competitors. In regard, the Commission 
pronounced such data to be generally understood as a commodity. Furthermore, the majority 
of respondents to the market investigation assumed that there would be alternatives to which 
they could switch in case the joint venture raised its prices. Based on all information 
available, the Commission came to the conclusion that the merger would not foreclose 
competing providers of advertising services and it would not have a negative impact on 
competition on the market for (mobile) data analytics, market research services or marketing 
information services.179 
 
According to the Annual Report on Competition Policy 2012, “… the Commission's central 
concern was to ensure that these types of markets remain open so that a number of competing 
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solutions can emerge without undue obstacles.”180 The Commission’s approach is evidently 
based on the test whether a particular database would post-merger become an essential input 
crucial for competitors to access, but at the same time non-replicable and unmatchable by 
them. The main factors determining the essentiality of a database are the nature of data 
themselves, the tools required to gather such data and the ability of competitors to access 
such data through other sources.181 
 
5.4 PUBLICIS/OMNICOM 
5.4.1 THE PARTIES AND BACKGROUND 
Publicis was an international provider of advertising services including digital advertising, 
creative services or media strategy. Omnicom was a global advertising, marketing and 
corporate communications company offering a range of advertising, marketing, media or 
other related services. The transaction aimed to create a large advertising company, in which 
the shareholders of Publicis and Omnicom would each hold approximately 50% of the equity 
of the merged group.182 The Commission concluded that all requirements necessary for the 
EU merger assessment were fulfilled and launched an investigation.183  
 
5.4.2 INPUT FORECLOSURE 
The parties indicated that one of the rationales of the proposed merger was to develop its 
activity in “big data" analytics. On that account, the Commission first tried to predict the 
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importance of big data in the near future as a key factor for better online advertising and 
attracting new customers. The assumptions about the extent to which big data might be a 
crucial component in conducting a business differed for competitors but were observed to be 
gradually more relevant mainly for companies active online. Furthermore, the Commission 
investigated the potential availability and access to big data for competing advertising 
companies post-merger, in case the merged entity was to develop its own big data analytics 
platform and refused the access to its competitors. Based on the investigation, the 
Commission came to the conclusion that the negative impact of such conduct would be 
limited as rival companies were at that time either using their own data analytics platform or 
one from third parties since a sufficient number of third-party suppliers provided big data 
analytics at the time of the investigation. As a result, the merged entity’s big data analytics 
platform would likely not constitute an essential input for other advertising companies, thus 
preventing the emergence of input foreclosure.184 The main reasons for declaring the merger 
compatible with the market were summarised in the Commission’s press release as the 
bidding nature of the markets, the presence of other large competitors, the relatively low 
barriers to entry, and the significant countervailing power of media vendors.185 
 
5.5 FACEBOOK/WHATSAPP 
5.5.1 THE PARTIES AND BACKGROUND 
Facebook provided a range of services, namely websites and mobile applications offering 
social networking via platform ‘Facebook’, consumer communication services via ‘Facebook 
Messenger’ app and photo/video sharing functionalities via platform ‘Instagram’. WhatsApp 
was also a provider of consumer communications services via its mobile application 
‘WhatsApp’. Only Facebook was providing online advertising services on its websites and 
mobile applications, WhatsApp did not sell any advertising space. The proposed transaction 
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was comprised of WhatsApp successively merging with and into wholly-owned subsidiaries 
of Facebook, thereby Facebook solely controlling the entity into which WhatsApp would 
have merged. Despite a lack of Community dimension, requirements for referral to 
Commission were fulfilled and the Commission commenced the merger assessment.186 
 
5.5.2 DATA TO STRENGTHEN POSITION 
The Commission examined potential anti-competitive issues regarding data in relation to 
online advertising services that constituted a relevant market on their own. The core of the 
investigation was potential data concentration to the extent that it was likely to strengthen 
Facebook’s position in the online advertising market or any sub-segments. From the factual 
point of view, only Facebook was active in the provision of online advertising services, which 
was based on the analysis of data gathered from Facebook’s users, such as information about 
age, gender, or activities users were interested in. On the contrary, WhatsApp did not collect 
any data valuable for advertising purposes (except for users’ names and the mobile phone 
numbers associated with their accounts) at the time of the investigation, nor did it engage in 
the online advertising business. The Commission analysed two theories of harm based either 
on using WhatsApp as a source of user data for the purpose of targeted advertising, or on 
introducing advertisement to WhatsApp itself.187 
 
Firstly, the Commission assessed market with WhatsApp as a potential provider of online 
advertising space, which could have the effect of reinforcing Facebook's position. Changing 
WhatsApp’s privacy policy would theoretically allow to introduce targeted advertising on 
this platform. Nonetheless, Facebook might lack the incentive since as a result of deviating 
from the "no ads" product strategy, users might switch to competing apps free of 
advertisements. Furthermore, abandoning end-to-end encryption could create dissatisfaction 
among the users who significantly value privacy and security, and again result in the loss of 
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users. This effect could be demonstrated by a high number of German users switching from 
WhatsApp to another application within 24 hours from the announcement of the merger. 
Even if Facebook used WhatsApp for online advertising as an advertising space, there would 
still remain a sufficient number of other actual or potential competitors who were equally 
well placed as Facebook to offer online advertising place. Therefore, the Commission 
concluded that in any event, the transaction would not raise any competition concerns.188 
 
Secondly, the Commission explored a scenario, in which Facebook would nonetheless 
initiate collecting data from WhatsApp users post-merger to improve the accuracy of targeted 
advertisements on Facebook’s services shown to users who were also active on WhatsApp. 
Consequently, Facebook would strengthen its position on the account of the greater amount 
of user data under Facebook’s control. Regarding Facebook’s ability to collect data from 
WhatsApp, this would require amendments to WhatsApp’s privacy policy, overcoming 
major technical obstacles to link each user’s WhatsApp profile to their Facebook profile, and 
abandoning the end-to-end encryption. Regarding Facebook’s incentive, the Commission 
identified some indications that the merged entity might not engage in such conduct due to 
the realistic risk of users switching to less intrusive consumer communication apps. 
Nevertheless, the Commission concluded that even if such scenario occurred, the transaction 
would not have a significant anti-competitive impact, since a large amount of user data 
valuable for advertising services would still be available to other competitors beyond 
Facebook’s exclusive control.189 
 
On this basis, and the fact that the Commission did not recognize any competition concerns 
in regard to the other two relevant markets, namely the market for social networking services 
and consumer communications services, the Commission cleared the transaction 
unconditionally and declared it compatible with the internal market and with the EEA 
Agreement.190 As summarised in Report on Competition Policy 2014, “… The merger was 
                                                 
188 Ibid., para. 168-179 
189 Ibid., para. 180-189 





approved without conditions, in particular in light of the dynamic nature of the market, low 
entry barriers and sufficient remaining competition.”191 
 
5.5.3 POST-MERGER EVENTS 
Regarding the merger control assessment, Facebook and WhatsApp respectively publicly 
pledged to not merge the two databases of user information and not to violate WhatsApp’s 
privacy policy.192 Even though the Facebook’s acquisition of WhatsApp was not challenged 
by the US antitrust authority Federal Trade Commission, shortly before the Commission’s 
clearance of the transaction, the Federal Trade Commission sent a letter to the parties urging 
them to honour these promises made to the consumers as it otherwise could constitute 
deceptive or unfair practices in violation of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission 
Act.193 
 
Furthermore, in December 2016 the Commission issued a Statement of Objections addressed 
to Facebook alleging that the company to have provided incorrect or misleading information 
during the merger review.194 During the investigation, Facebook had argued that it would be 
unable to establish reliable, automated matching between user’s accounts on Facebook and 
WhatsApp. However, in August 2016 WhatsApp had changed its privacy policy to actually 
make it able to link a user’s phone number to their Facebook identity. The Commission found 
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out that such possibility had already existed during merger investigation and was known to 
Facebook; Facebook had therefore submitted incorrect or misleading information. 
Eventually, the Commission fined Facebook €110 million for providing incorrect or 
misleading information during the Commission's 2014 investigation under the EU Merger 
Regulation of Facebook's acquisition of WhatsApp.195 “Today's decision sends a clear signal 
to companies that they must comply with all aspects of EU merger rules, including the 
obligation to provide correct information. And it imposes a proportionate and deterrent fine 
on Facebook. The Commission must be able to take decisions about mergers' effects on 
competition in full knowledge of accurate facts.” emphasized by Margrethe Vestager in the 
Commission’s press release regarding the Facebook’s fine.196 
 
5.6 MICROSOFT/LINKEDIN 
5.6.1 THE PARTIES AND BACKGROUND 
Microsoft was a global technology company offering a wide range of products in technology, 
media and telecom sector, primarily operating systems for personal computers, servers, 
mobile devices, and other related or unrelated services, such as hardware devices or online 
advertising mainly through its search engine Bing. LinkedIn managed a professional social 
network generating revenue through recruiting tools, online education courses, market 
solutions allowing advertising to its members, and premium subscriptions fees. Through a 
proposed transaction, Microsoft would acquire all the shares and a sole control over 
LinkedIn. The transaction was considered a concentration with a Community dimension; 
hence the Commission launched a merger assessment.197 
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5.6.2 COMBINATION OF DATA 
The Commission first addressed the possible competitive impacts deriving from the post-
merger combination of data previously held by two independent companies regarding online 
advertising services. Proceeding on the assumption that such data accumulation would be 
allowed under the applicable data protection legislation, two theories of harm potentially 
arising in relation to the combination of the merging parties’ datasets investigated. First, the 
combination could increase the merged entity’s market power in a hypothetical market for 
the supply of such data or increase barriers to entry or expansion in the market. Second, in 
the absence of post-merger data combination due to either technical possibilities or 
intentions, the merger might eliminate important competition constraints originating between 
the merging parties that pre-merger competed with each other on the basis of the data they 
controlled.198 
 
The Commission dismissed both theories of harm on the following grounds. First, the merger 
would not reduce the amount of data available to other competitors since the merging parties 
did not provide access to their data to third parties for advertising purposes; if so, with very 
limited exceptions. Second, a large amount of data valuable for advertising purposes would 
still remain accessible to other competitors post-merger and not exclusively under the merged 
entity’s control. Aside from this, the elimination of competition on the basis of data would 
be insignificant since the companies were small market players on the particular relevant 
market and only competed with each to a very limited extent. On this basis, together with the 
low combined market share of the merged entity, the Commission dismissed any anti-
competitive concerns resulting from the combination of data in the market of online 
advertising services.199 
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5.6.3 INPUT FORECLOSURE 
Since the increasing importance of data is a distinguishing feature of today’s digital economy, 
there were concerns that LinkedIn data might become an important input for certain software 
solutions through machine learning or artificial intelligence techniques. This could have been 
particularly a case in the market for the customer relationship management (“CRM”) 
software solutions, where already accumulated data together with data from LinkedIn might 
provide better insights. As a result, the merged entity would gain a competitive advantage 
making it more difficult for competitors to compete and innovate. Consequently, the 
Commission examined whether the merged entity could potentially prevent competitors from 
gaining access to LinkedIn full data thereby engaging in the input foreclosure.200 
 
The Commission initially noted that at the time of the merger proposition, LinkedIn did not 
engage in monetization strategy by offering its data to third parties, but it remained unclear 
whether it would have changed. Nevertheless, the investigation led the Commission to 
dismiss this theory of harm due to the following reasons. First, LinkedIn did not meet the 
requirement of a significant degree of market power in any potential relevant upstream 
market, in this case for the provision of data for CRM software solutions. Second, LinkedIn’s 
full data was not evaluated as an important input within the meaning of paragraph 34 of the 
Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines. Given that all major CRM providers had already started 
offering advanced functionalities based on machine learning or planned to do so within the 
next few years, LinkedIn data was further deemed not even to become an important input in 
the near future. Third, LinkedIn data would constitute only one type of data valuable for 
machine learning, and LinkedIn would become only one of the sources of such data already 
available for machine learning. As regards to the Microsoft’s incentive, the investigation 
showed that any foreclosing strategy could possibly translate into substantial financial losses, 
which might not be compensated by gains from the expanding market shares within the 
market. Microsoft’s intentions communicated in their internal documents and their behaviour 
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regarding their other products suggested that they on the contrary had an incentive to continue 
collaborations with other providers. In the light of the above, the Commission identified the 
transaction as unlikely to have a negative impact on effective competition in the relevant 
market, and to eventually lead to consumer harm.201 
 
5.6.4 DATA TO STRENGTHEN POSITION 
The third theory of harm in relation to data was based on concern that post-merger, the 
combination of Microsoft’s operating systems and productivity software with LinkedIn’s 
professional social network (“PSN”) services could strengthen LinkedIn’s position in the 
market for PSN services. As repeatedly acknowledged in the Commission Staff Working 
Document, at the time of the investigation LinkedIn’s market power had already been 
significant, thus the increase in its user base would make it more difficult for other companies 
to provide PSN services in the EEA; the merger hence entrenching LinkedIn’s position and 
consequently leading to the foreclosure of other competitors and harm to competition.202 
 
The market investigation demonstrated both the merged entity’s ability and incentive to pre-
install a LinkedIn application on Windows personal computers and integrate LinkedIn 
features into Office. This strategy could potentially lead to a growth of the size and usage of 
LinkedIn's PSN platform in a way that competitors could be unlikely to match. The effect 
could be additionally enhanced by virtue of network effects present on the market for PSN 
services, which would not likely be sufficiently reduced by multi-homing or by the entry of 
new PSN service provider. This market situation could eventually lead to market tipping in 
favour of LinkedIn’s platform.203 
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The potential detrimental effect of the strengthened market position would be twofold. First, 
LinkedIn’s platform would become the only PSN service provider in the EEA, thus robbing 
consumers of other choices and making an entry of competing companies almost impossible. 
Second, in case these foreclosure effects would lead to the marginalisation of an existing 
competitor that offers a greater degree of privacy protection, the merger would also reduce 
consumer choice in relation to that important privacy parameter of competition when 
choosing a professional social network. For all the above reasons, the Commission concluded 
that the transaction will likely have a negative impact on effective competition in the market 
for PSN services in EEA.204 
 
Competition Commissioner Margrethe Vestager commented on the decision saying that “A 
growing number of Europeans subscribe to professional social networks. These networks are 
important for professionals to connect and interact and to find new career opportunities. 
Today's decision ensures that Europeans will continue to enjoy a freedom of choice between 


















                                                 
204 Ibid., para. 348-352 
205 EUROPEAN COMMISSION. Press release. Mergers: Commission approves acquisition of LinkedIn by 







The digital economy is nowadays considered to be a symbol of growing power and potential 
of big data and data in general. In 2014, former Director-General for Competition Alexander 
Italianer summarised competition policy in the digital age saying that Internet’s ease of use, 
worldwide reach, and speed of innovation provide new dimensions to the classic competition 
concerns.206 Today’s digital environment helps incumbent or new companies in various 
sectors outperform their competitors, encourages them to compete, innovate and create value 
not only, but to a large extent thanks to big data. Big data is a blanket term that covers 
collections of almost all forms of data that are massive in size, complex and heterogeneous, 
such that conventional data management means lack the ability to process them. Such data is 
generated by the interaction of individuals and companies and may be either voluntarily 
disclosed or observed as a by-product, often without the knowledge of the user. The 
significance of big data does not revolve solely around the size of data collected by the 
company, but rather company’s ability to efficiently utilise gathered data by optimising 
working processes, improving quality of their products and services through for instance 
personalisation, or even creating a new quality. As Hal Varian, chief economist at Google 
pointed out – it’s not about the quantity or quality of the ingredients, but about the recipe.207  
 
Big data allows collecting, processing and linking previously unimaginably large amounts of 
data that makes it possible to predict human behaviour and identify data patterns, trends, and 
correlations. As data is becoming a valuable asset and an essential input factor, it is more and 
more important to assess its role from a competition law perspective, particularly in terms of 
merger control policy. In the context of concentrations, an attractive merger partner might 
not always be the one with a huge turnover, rather the one with a set of valuable data, as 
highlighted by Competition Commissioner Margrethe Vestager.208 A data-related merger is 
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however accompanied by a range of risks related mainly to the concentration of data within 
the control of few companies, following use of collected data and its potential negative 
outcomes and distortion of competition. The challenge for competition policy enforcers is to 
separate cases requiring closer scrutiny from the ones where data ownership and usage is 
economically beneficial, drives innovation and is competitively harmless.  
 
To assess the implications of data for competition policy, it is vital that competition law and 
competition authorities are able to capture markets that profoundly rely upon the collection 
of data. This being said, the essential requirement is that competition authorities properly and 
thoroughly address potentially anti-competitive practises of companies that might comprise 
of acquiring data or preventing their competitors from collecting data. To summarise the 
major challenges for competition law in markets where data collection is crucial, the author 
closely examined the following: 
 
I. Challenges in defining the relevant market and assessing the degree of market 
concentration 
 
Firstly, the issue of data-related relevant market determination needs to be clarified. Under 
accepted market definition tests, requirements for defining a relevant market include the sale 
and the demand substitutability of products and services. In case data is traded, the existence 
of potential competition is basically undeniable, and can constitute a market definition. In 
the absence of sales where data represents purely a key input, none of the General Court, 
European Court of Justice, or the Commission have ever defined a separate relevant market 
around data used solely as an input. There are mixed opinions and arguments on whether 
such market definition should be adopted in the future, but there is no legal support so far. 
Regarding the market concentration, the dynamic environment of data-related markets 
provides a relatively low informative value when it comes to market shares and concentration 
levels, which may be derived primarily from the volatility and inconstancy of such markets. 
To conclude, under prevailing competition law principles, the relevant market for online 





data as an object since no economic transaction takes place between the providers and users 
for data, and these do not sell or trade data to third parties. 
 
II. Challenges in determining the market power by assessing the possibility of 
entry barriers arising out of the economics of data, in particular, the 
increasing returns to scale and scope combined with networks effects on one 
hand, and economic properties mitigating competitive concerns of data on the 
other hand 
 
Secondly, to assess the importance of data in determining market power, competition 
authorities need to take into consideration the overall characteristics of the big data eco-
system and relationships within the markets. Competition Commissioner Vestager proposed 
the same theory saying that “… having the right set of data could make it almost impossible 
for anyone else to keep up. So, we need to be sure that companies which control that sort of 
data don't use it to stop others from competing.”209 While examining the possibility of data-
related entry barriers, competition authorities should examine the presence of direct and 
indirect network effects, which may cause the market to tip in favour of a few companies, 
and the extent of the economies of scale and scope, specifically what is the marginal benefit 
of holding more data and how significant it is to combine different types of data. In essence, 
the advantages arising out of the scale and scope of data include improved outputs, greater 
relevance, and better targeting. These economies can be moreover intensified by network 
effects, this reinforcing the market power of the company in question. 
 
It is nonetheless reasonable to include the appraisal of basic economic properties of data that 
conversely mitigate its competitive concerns. Data availability, low cost, and replicability 
may in some cases decrease potential anti-competitive implications of data. New competitors 
entering the market are, as a result, unlikely to be at a significant competitive disadvantage 
when it comes to data collecting and processing. In this regard, it is also important to consider 
                                                 





the time depreciation value of data and the extensive multi-homing of users, that both serve 
to reduce market power. Having said that, the sole collection of data is not sufficient to 
declare the merger detrimental to the competition. The primary concern lies in the application 
and use of data; therefore, the Commission needs to conduct a case-by-case analysis and in 
each case evaluate whether the data concerned is unique enough to create barriers to entry 
and force the competitors out of the market. Establishing an objective standard applicable 
would not be sufficient since the value of the data is derived primarily from its subsequent 
use as analysed above.  
 
III. Challenges in constituting a convincing data-related theory of harm 
 
Thirdly, the Commission has in the past years developed several data-related theories of harm 
indicating how the merger might harm the competition. The proposed theories were based 
on the competitive concerns arising out of the combination of merging parties’ data 
collections, the ability, and incentive of the merged entity to foreclose its competitors or the 
newly merged datasets to strengthen the position of the merging companies. 
 
When it comes to the application of theory to practise, the analysis of the Commission’s 
decisions in data-related mergers provides an informative and constructive overview of the 
Commission’s approach towards competitive concerns of data in relation to mergers and its 
development throughout the years. The Commission is generally assessing whether merging 
companies that gain access to a set of data via mergers could constitute the access to a 
valuable and essential dataset, unlikely to be replicated by competitors, and a source of 
significant market power. 
 
The Commission recognized the importance of data in TomTom/Tele Atlas merger, where it 
also defined the market for data, more precisely for databases of digital maps, since data in 
question was truly traded as a product. One of the first instances where the Commission 
integrated more complex big data considerations into its merger assessments was the 





The Commission analysed the competitive implications of the combination of data in 
Google/DoubleClick, Telefónica UK/Vodafone UK/Everything Everywhere and 
Microsoft/LinkedIn merger cases. The substance of the analysis was to determine whether 
post-merger database would constitute an essential input, unmatchable and non-replicable by 
other competitors. The investigation indeed included assessment of various other 
circumstances specific to each case. The Commission considered inter alia the nature of data, 
the tools required to collect such data and the ability of competitors to access data through 
other sources. Based on these merger decisions, the mere combination of data did not a priori 
constitute an impediment to effective competition; the access to homogenous substitutes that 
are readily available was an important factor to consider. The Commission, therefore, 
dismissed this theory of harm in all three merger cases. 
 
TomTom/Tele Atlas, Publicis/Omnicom, and Microsoft/LinkedIn were merger cases, in 
which the Commission predicted the possibility of vertical input foreclosure. When 
conducting the competitive assessment of input foreclosure around data, the Commission 
examined whether post-merger the dataset of the merged entity would have constituted an 
essential input, and consequently whether the transaction could have led to the foreclosure 
of other competitors. The investigation focused on both the ability and the incentive of the 
merged entities to restrict access to valuable data, as well as the overall likely impact on 
effective competition. In contrast, what furthermore needs to be taken into consideration is 
also the lack of exclusivity in the collection of data, non-rivalrous nature of data related to 
multi-homing, and the fact that not all types of data are valuable for all purposes; these factors 
make the possibility of data-related input foreclosure more unlikely. The Commission did 
not identify the input foreclosure scenario to take place in any of the above-analysed cases. 
 
Data strengthening the position of the merged entity was the theory of harm 
investigated in Facebook/WhatsApp and Microsoft/LinkedIn cases. The Commission 
examined the impacts of potential data concentration to the extent that it was likely to 
strengthen the merged entity’s position on the market. In both cases, the investigation 





technical and contractual obstacles preventing such outcome, the situation on the market, 
including the ability and the incentive of the merging parties. Despite the prominence and 
the value of these transactions, the evidence gathered during the thorough market 
investigation revealed that competition concerns related to this theory of harm were 
unwarranted. 
 
The statements, speeches, and commentaries of the Commission officials evidently indicate 
the Commission’s awareness that competition policy and enforcement need to embrace the 
particularities of big data and digital economy. From the analysis of the above-mentioned 
data-related mergers, it can be concluded that the Commission’s approach to assessment 
indicates a significant degree of consistency between different cases. In essence, it is evident 
that conventional theories of harm can be applied to mergers featuring big data, even though 
the issues that arose in the reviewed cases were notably similar. Needless to say, the decisions 
adopted in all the above cases are highly fact- and case-specific and the Commission should, 
and apparently will assess each future merger case on its own merits. However, from the 
competition policy perspective, the Commission’s decision making is valuable since it 
provides insights on how the currently applicable competition law principles tackle the novel 
issues related to big data emerging in the digital economy. 
 
As a concluding remark, the author would like to draw attention to the growing trend of 
inclusion and reliance on big data in all areas of the economy, which indicates that data-
related aspects will feature prominently in the future Commission cases. Due to the 
continuous development of usage and exploitation of data, competition authorities as well as 
general the public need to pay a close attention to, and continuously evaluate and update their 
approach to the matter. Big data is neither inherently good nor bad and it cannot be ignored; 
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BIG DATA AND EU MERGER CONTROL 
ABSTRACT 
The significance of “big data” as a factor in the competitive assessment of mergers in EU has 
attracted more and more attention in the past years. Today’s digital economy revolves around 
the Internet and information technologies that together enabled collecting and processing 
previously unimaginable sets of data, high in volume, velocity, variety and value. Data started 
to present a valuable and important asset to various businesses, mainly active on online 
platforms. Consequently, companies may engage in strategic mergers in order to acquire 
profitable data from one another. The aim of this master thesis is to research and analyse 
whether big data could result in the increased market power of the newly merged company 
or could have detrimental effects on other competitors present on the market or the 
competition itself. The main research question therefore is whether big data in its essence 
could constitute a competitive concern when it comes to data-related mergers. 
 
This thesis initially clarifies the concept and characteristics of “big data” in general, whilst 
demonstrating the increasing significance of data used as assets for businesses in the present 
digital economy. The research then focuses on what role specific features of data could play 
in various stages of competitive assessments of merger conducted by the European 
Commission; the research considers both amplifying as well as mitigating competitive effects 
of data in the context of merger control. The core analysis lies in determining a data-related 
theory of harm, theoretically and in practise. The primary aim is to establish the coinciding 
principles, anomalies, consistency of decision-making and the overall approach of the 
European Commission towards unconventional data-related merger cases. This thesis 
analyses six major mergers, provides a critical assessment of identified theories of harm with 
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XII 
BIG DATA A KONTROLA SPOJOVÁNÍ PODNIKŮ V EU 
ABSTRAKT 
V uplynulých letech začala být stále větší pozornost věnována konceptu „big data“ jako 
jednoho z faktorů v rámci soutěžního posouzení fúzí v EU. Dnešní digitální ekonomika je 
postavena na internetu a informačních technologiích, které společně umožnily shromažďovat 
a zpracovávat dosud nepředstavitelné sady dat, charakteristické velkými objemy, rychlostí, 
rozmanitostí a hodnotou. Data začaly představovat cenný a důležitý přínos pro různé 
podniky, které působí převážně na on-line platformách. V důsledku toho se společnosti 
mohou zapojit do strategických fúzí za účelem získání vzájemně výhodných dat. Cílem této 
diplomové práce je prozkoumat a analyzovat, zda by „big data“ mohly vést ke zvýšení tržní 
síly nově sloučené společnosti, nebo by mohly mít škodlivé účinky na ostatní konkurenty 
přítomné na trhu nebo na soutěž samotnou. Hlavní výzkumná otázka proto spočívá v tom, 
zda by „big data“ ze své podstaty mohly z pohledu soutěžního práva představovat problém, 
pokud jde o fúze, při kterých dochází k spojení velkých zásob dat. 
 
Tato práce zprvu objasňuje koncept a charakteristiku "big data" obecně, a současně 
poukazuje na rostoucí význam dat užívaných jako aktiva podniků v současné digitální 
ekonomice. Výzkum se pak zaměřuje na to, jakou roli by specifické rysy dat mohly hrát v 
různých fázích soutěžního posouzení fúzí prováděných Evropskou komisí; výzkum se 
zaměřuje na posílení a rovněž i zmírnění soutěžních efektů dat v souvislosti s kontrolou fúzí. 
Základná analýza spočívá v určení takové teorie újmy, která souvisí s daty, a to teoreticky i 
prakticky. Hlavním cílem je vymezit shodující se principy, anomálie, konzistenci v 
rozhodování a celkový přístup Evropské komise k nekonvenčním případům fúzí 
souvisejících s daty. Tato práce analyzuje šest hlavních fúzí, kriticky analyzuje 
identifikované teorie újmy ve vztahu k „big data“, a nabízí konečný závěr o „big data“ v 
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